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PRIVACY AND SECURITY IN THE CLOUD: SOME 
REALISM ABOUT TECHNICAL SOLUTIONS TO 
TRANSNATIONAL SURVEILLANCE IN THE POST-
SNOWDEN ERA† 
Joris V.J. van Hoboken* and Ira S. Rubinstein** 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Since June 2013, the leak of thousands of classified documents regarding 
highly sensitive U.S. surveillance activities by former National Security Agency 
(NSA) contractor Edward Snowden has greatly intensified discussions of privacy, 
trust, and freedom in relation to the use of global computing and communication 
services.  This is happening during a period of ongoing transition to cloud 
computing services by organizations, businesses, and individuals.1  There has 
always been a question inherent in this transition: are cloud services sufficiently 
able to guarantee the security of their customers’ data as well as the proper 
restrictions on access by third parties, including governments?  While worries over 
government access to data in the cloud is a predominate part of the ongoing debate 
over the use of cloud services,2 the Snowden revelations highlight that intelligence 
agency operations pose a unique threat to the ability of services to keep their 
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 1. With respect to cloud services, we follow the accepted definition of cloud computing given by 
the National Institute for Standards and Technology (NIST): “a model for enabling ubiquitous, 
convenient, on-demand network access to a shared pool of configurable computing resources (e.g., 
networks, servers, storage, applications, and services) that can be rapidly provisioned and released with 
minimal management effort or service provider interaction.”  PETER MELL & TIMOTHY GRANCE, NAT’L 
INST. FOR STANDARDS & TECH, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, THE NIST DEFINITION OF CLOUD 
COMPUTING 2 (Sept. 2011), available at http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-145/SP800-
145.pdf. 
 2. See, e.g., Fred H. Cate, James X. Dempsey, & Ira S. Rubinstein, Systematic Government Access 
to Private-Sector Data, 2 INT’L DATA PRIVACY L. 195, 198-99 (2012), available at 
http://idpl.oxfordjournals.org/content/2/4/195.full.pdf; Ira S. Rubinstein, Gregory T. Nojeim, & Ronald 
D. Lee, Systematic Government Access to Personal Data: A Comparative Analysis, 4 INT’L DATA 
PRIVACY L. (forthcoming 2014), available at https://cdt.org/files/pdfs/govaccess2013/government-
access-to-data-comparative-analysis.pdf; Joris van Hoboken, Axel Arnbak, & Nico van Eijk, Obscured 
by Clouds or How to Address Governmental Access to Cloud Data from Abroad (June 7, 2013) 
(unpublished manuscript) (available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2276103); 
Randal Milch, Thoughts on Foreign Data Storage and the Patriot Act, VERIZON POL’Y BLOG (Jan. 27, 
2014), http://publicpolicy.verizon.com/blog/entry/thoughts-on-foreign-data-storage-and-the-patriot-act; 
Brad Smith, Protecting Customer Data from Government Snooping, OFFICIAL MICROSOFT BLOG (Dec. 
4, 2013, 9:00 PM), http://blogs.technet.com/b/microsoft_blog/archive/2013/12/04/protecting-customer-
data-from-government-snooping.aspx. 
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customers’ data out of the hands of domestic as well as foreign governments.3  The 
search for a proper response is ongoing, from the perspective of market players, 
governments, and civil society. 
At the technical and organizational level, industry players are responding with 
the wider and more sophisticated deployment of encryption as well as a new 
emphasis on the use of privacy enhancing technologies and innovative architectures 
for securing their services.4  These responses are the focus of this Article, which 
contributes to the discussion of transnational surveillance by looking at the 
interaction between the relevant legal frameworks on the one hand, and the 
possible technical and organizational responses of cloud service providers to such 
surveillance on the other.  While the Article’s aim is to contribute to the debate 
about government surveillance with respect to cloud services in particular, much of 
the discussion is relevant for Internet services more broadly. 
A. Transnational Surveillance 
Transnational surveillance of data in the cloud presents complex scenarios that 
are currently not handled in any satisfactory way by existing legal or technical 
mechanisms.  Of particular complexity is the question of whether and how globally 
operating services can ensure that the data of an individual or organization in 
‘country T’ (the targeted country) can be secured from disproportionate access by a 
government agency in ‘country A’ (the accessing country).  In practice, many 
scenarios are even more complex, given there may be agencies in multiple 
countries seeking access to data of a particular organization, data that could be 
                                                                                                     
 3. See infra Parts I.B., III. 
 4. See, e.g., Matthew Taylor, NSA Revelations ‘Changing How Businesses Store Sensitive Data’, 
THE GUARDIAN, Mar. 31, 2014, http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2014/mar/31/data-storage-nsa-
revelations-businesses-snowden; Nicole Perlroth, A Call for a Highly Encrypted Future, N.Y. TIMES 
BITS BLOG (Mar. 12, 2014, 6:56 PM), http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/03/12/a-call-for-a-highly-
encrypted-future; Jon Fingas, FreedomPop's New Smartphone Keeps Your Calls and Data Private for 
$189, ENGADGET (Mar. 5, 2014, 12:00 AM), http://www.engadget.com/2014/03/05/freedompop-
privacy-phone; Loek Essers, KPN Strikes Deal with Silent Circle to Offer Encrypted Phone Calls, 
PCWORLD (Feb. 19, 2014, 3:15 AM), http://www.pcworld.com/article/2099160/kpn-strikes-deal-with-
silent-circle-to-offer-encrypted-phone-calls.html; David Meyer, Meet Blackphone, A Privacy-Centric 
Handset from Some Serious Security Veterans, GIGAOM (Jan. 15, 2014, 1:21 AM), 
http://gigaom.com/2014/01/15/meet-blackphone-a-security-centric-handset-from-some-serious-
encryption-veterans; Nicole Perlroth & Vindu Goel, Twitter Toughening Its Security to Thwart 
Government Snoops, N.Y. TIMES BITS BLOG (Nov. 22, 2013, 4:22 PM), 
http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/11/22/twitter-toughening-its-security-to-thwart-government-
snoops/?_php=true&_type=blogs&_r=0; Sean Gallagher, Googlers say “F*** You” to NSA, Company 
Encrypts Internal Network, ARS TECHNICA (Nov. 6, 2013, 3:35 PM), http://arstechnica.com/ 
information-technology/2013/11/googlers-say-f-you-to-nsa-company-encrypts-internal-network; Claire 
Cain Miller, Angry Over U.S. Surveillance, Tech Giants Bolster Defenses, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 1, 2013, at 
A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/01/technology/angry-over-us-surveillance-tech-
giants-bolster-defenses.html; Kurt Opsahl, 6 Steps Silicon Valley Can Take to Protect Users from NSA 
Spying, CNET (Oct. 30, 2013, 5:43 PM), http://news.cnet.com/8301-13578_3-57610139-38/6-steps-
silicon-valley-can-take-to-protect-users-from-nsa-spying; Adrianne Jeffries, Escape from PRISM: How 
Twitter Defies Government Data-Sharing, THE VERGE (Jun. 13, 2013, 1:18 PM), 
http://www.theverge.com/2013/6/13/4426420/twitter-prism-alex-macgillivray-NSA-government.  See 
also Smith, supra note 2.  
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stored and transmitted across multiple international locations. 
It is well established that lawful access frameworks in different jurisdictions 
permit—to varying extents—transnational access to cloud data.5  The use of 
transnational surveillance by foreign governments to access international data 
outside the terms of Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties is generally considered 
problematic from a legal perspective.6  In Europe, the discussion has taken place 
with a particular reference to the USA PATRIOT Act and other U.S. lawful access 
authorities with possible extraterritorial effect.7  Notably, research has shown that 
the extraterritorial application of such laws is not necessarily unique to the U.S.; 
rather, the U.S. occupies a unique position due to the global strength of U.S. cloud 
services.8  
The question of transnational surveillance is of special interest for a number of 
reasons.  First, it is likely that individuals, businesses, and organizations want to 
minimize foreign government access to their data.9  Second, it has become clear 
that certain States may impose legal requirements on cloud services aimed at 
preventing such access from taking place.  Examples of this include discussions 
about “localization” (i.e., requiring that services locate their operations inside the 
country where the service is offered and/or provide local storage of data) in Europe 
and Brazil, and the debate about the revision of the European data protection 
                                                                                                     
 5. See, e.g., Rubinstein et al., supra note 2, at 43 (noting that “[a]s Internet-based services have 
become globalized, trans-border surveillance—surveillance in one country affecting citizens of 
another—has flourished”). 
 6. See, e.g., IAN BROWN & DOUWE KORFF, GLOBAL NETWORK INITIATIVE, DIGITAL FREEDOMS IN 
INTERNATIONAL LAW: PRACTICAL STEPS TO PROTECT HUMAN RIGHTS ONLINE (2012), available at 
http://globalnetworkinitiative.org/sites/default/files/Digital%20Freedoms%20in%20International%20La
w_0.pdf. 
 7. See, e.g., CASPAR BOWDEN, EUR. PARLIAMENT POL’Y DEPT., CITIZENS’ RTS. & CONST. AFF., 
THE U.S. SURVEILLANCE PROGRAMMES AND THEIR IMPACT ON EU CITIZENS' FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS 
(2013), available at 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2009_2014/documents/libe/dv/briefingnote_/briefingnote_en.p
df; DIDIER BIGO ET AL., EUR. PARLIAMENT POL’Y DEPT., CITIZENS’ RTS. & CONST. AFF., FIGHTING 
CYBER CRIME AND PROTECTING PRIVACY IN THE CLOUD (2012), available at 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/committees/en/studiesdownload.html?languageDocument=EN&file=790
50; Judith Rauhofer & Caspar Bowden, Protecting Their Own: Fundamental Rights Implications for EU 
Data Sovereignty in the Cloud (Univ. of Edinburgh Sch. of Law, Working Paper No. 2013/28, 2013), 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2283175; Zack Whittacker, Patriot Act 
Can "Obtain" Data in Europe, Researchers Say, CBS NEWS (Dec. 4, 2012, 5:19 PM), 
http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-205_162-57556674/patriot-act-can-obtain-data-in-europe-researchers-
say.  The EU data protection framework as it relates to trans-border data flows to the United States also 
plays an important role in this discussion. See Memorandum 13/1059 from the Eur. Comm’n on 
Restoring Trust in EU-US Data Flows (Nov. 27, 2013) (available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-
release_MEMO-13-1059_en.htm). 
 8. See Rubinstein et al., supra note 2, at 43.  For some comparative data, see also WINSTON 
MAXWELL & CHRISTOPHER WOLF, HOGAN LOVELLS, A GLOBAL REALITY: GOVERNMENTAL ACCESS 
TO DATA IN THE CLOUD (2012), available at http://www.hldataprotection.com/uploads/file/ 
Revised%20Government%20Access%20to%20Cloud%20Data%20Paper%20(18%20July%2012).pdf. 
 9. See, e.g., EUR. NETWORK & INFO. SEC. AGENCY, CLOUD COMPUTING 45-46 (Daniele Catteddu 
& Giles Hogben eds., 2009), available at http://www.enisa.europa.eu/activities/risk-
management/files/deliverables/cloud-computing-risk-assessment. 
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framework.10  Third, fundamental questions remain and are the subject of official 
review, such as through the President’s Review Group,11 as to the appropriate 
standards and related safeguards for lawful access to data of foreign organizations 
and individuals.12  Finally, it seems likely that cross border markets and flows of 
data will continue to grow and intensify in light of the technology and market 
dynamics underlying cloud computing services.  Thus, the challenges for the cloud 
industry facing these unresolved issues of transnational cloud surveillance are 
substantial. 
B. A Cloud Industry Under Threat 
If anything, the Snowden leaks clearly illustrate that global cloud service 
providers are facing a new class of threats from intelligence agencies across the 
world.  The revelations are many and diverse in nature.  This Article proposes that, 
from the perspective of the cloud industry, the threats can be generally 
distinguished in terms of front-door versus backdoor access to data and 
communications handled by cloud providers.  Revelations of front-door access in 
the U.S. context include PRISM and the widely discussed telephone metadata 
program.13  The PRISM program is conducted on the basis of Section 702 of the 
FISA Amendments Act 2008 (FAA), under which the U.S. intelligence community 
has successfully gained access to data from U.S. cloud services related to non-U.S. 
persons reasonably believed to be outside the U.S.14  Under this program, the NSA 
gains access by demanding cloud and communication service providers hand over 
customer information and content, requiring annual certification, and with targeting 
and minimization procedures reviewed by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance 
Court.15  What is most striking about these programs is the structural basis and 
scale on which access takes place.  In addition, many have raised doubts about the 
statutory and constitutional basis of these programs under U.S., international, as 
well as foreign law.16  Observers and stakeholders from outside of the United States 
                                                                                                     
 10. See, e.g., Van Hoboken et al., supra note 2, at 25-32; Ian Traynor, New EU Rules to Curb 
Transfer of Data to U.S. After Edward Snowden Revelations, THE GUARDIAN, Oct. 17, 2013, 10:13 
EDT, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/oct/17/eu-rules-data-us-edward-snowden; Jefferson 
Ribeiro, Bill Would Allow Brazil to Decree Local Internet Data Storage, REUTERS (Nov. 5th, 2013, 3:34 
PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/11/05/net-us-brazil-internet-idUSBRE9A30SI20131105.  
 11. See PRESIDENT’S REVIEW GRP. ON INTELLIGENCE & COMM’CN TECH., LIBERTY AND SECURITY 
IN A CHANGING WORLD 153 (2013), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/ 
docs/2013-12-12_rg_final_report.pdf [hereinafter REVIEW GROUP REPORT]. 
 12. One such question is the territorial application of the privacy guarantees of certain human rights 
treaties.  See Charlie Savage, U.S. Seems Unlikely to Accept That Rights Treaty Applies to Its Actions 
Abroad, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 7, 2014, at A6, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/07/world/us-
seems-unlikely-to-accept-that-rights-treaty-applies-to-its-actions-abroad.html.  
 13. See infra Part II.C. 
 14. See id. 
 15. See NAT’L SEC. AGENCY, NSA DIRECTOR OF CIVIL LIBERTIES AND PRIVACY OFFICE REPORT: 
NSA'S IMPLEMENTATION OF FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT SECTION 702, at 2-3 (Apr. 16, 
2014), available at http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/0421/702%20Unclassified%20Document.pdf 
[hereinafter NSA FISA REPORT]. 
 16. For a discussion of legal issues related to Section 702 as the basis for programs like PRISM, see 
Jennifer Granick, Reforming the Section 702 Dragnet (Part 1), JUST SECURITY (Jan. 30, 2014, 5:24 PM) 
http://justsecurity.org/2014/01/30/reforming-section-702-dragnet-1.  See generally, Rubinstein et al., 
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are especially troubled by the fact that Section 702 would clearly violate the Fourth 
Amendment if it were designed to intercept the communications of U.S. persons.17 
Even more worrying from an industry perspective is that intelligence agencies 
have begun to gain backdoor access to the data handled by cloud providers.  
Backdoor access dispenses with serving orders on cloud providers or otherwise 
notifying them or seeking their cooperation.18  Reports about a variety of U.S. and 
British programs show how the intelligence community has systematically sought 
such backdoor access to data outside of the knowledge of cloud providers.  For 
example, a program known as MUSCULAR apparently enables the NSA to 
intercept the unencrypted data traffic between cloud provider data centers.19  
Similarly, the UPSTREAM program, details of which were revealed in 
combination with the revelations about PRISM, showed that the NSA was gaining 
sweeping access to Internet communications through the targeting of the 
telecommunications infrastructure.20  Additionally, the BULLRUN program 
                                                                                                     
supra note 2; Van Hoboken et al., supra note 2.  The Supreme Court reviewed a challenge to Section 
702 in Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1150 (2013) (holding that respondents lacked standing 
to challenge Section 702).  However, the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board (PCLOB), which 
is a board created by Congress to review and analyze executive branch anti-terrorism efforts and ensure 
that they are balanced with the need to protect privacy and civil liberties, see generally PRIVACY &  
CIVIL LIBERTIES OVERSIGHT BD., http://www.pclob.gov (last visited Apr. 21, 2014), recently issued a 
report in which it concluded that the metadata program was illegal under U.S. law.  See PRIVACY & 
CIVIL LIBERTIES OVERSIGHT BD., REPORT ON THE TELEPHONE RECORDS PROGRAM CONDUCTED UNDER 
SECTION 215 OF THE USA PATRIOT ACT AND ON THE OPERATIONS OF THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE 
SURVEILLANCE COURT (2014), available at http://www.pclob.gov/SiteAssets/Pages/default/PCLOB-
Report-on-the-Telephone-Records-Program.pdf.  The PCLOB is currently conducting a similar study of 
Section 702.  See PRIVACY &  CIVIL LIBERTIES OVERSIGHT BD., PUBLIC HEARING REGARDING THE  
SURVEILLANCE PROGRAM OPERATED PURSUANT TO SECTION 702 OF THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE 
SURVEILLANCE ACT (Mar. 19, 2014), available at http://www.pclob.gov/Library/Meetings-
Events/2014-March-19-Public-Hearing/19-March-2014_Public_Hearing_Transcript.pdf. 
 17. See REVIEW GROUP REPORT, supra note 11, at 153 (“If Section 702 were designed to intercept 
the communications of United States persons, it would clearly violate the Fourth Amendment.”).  See 
also REPORT ON THE FINDINGS BY THE EU CO-CHAIRS OF THE AD HOC EU-US WORKING GROUP ON 
DATA PROTECTION (2013), available at http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/files/report-findings-
of-the-ad-hoc-eu-us-working-group-on-data-protection.pdf  (“US persons benefit from constitutional 
protections (respectively, First and Fourth Amendments) that do not apply to EU citizens not residing in 
the U.S.”); COMM. ON CIVIL LIBERTIES, JUSTICE & HOME AFFAIRS, EUR. PARLIAMENT, DRAFT REPORT 
ON THE U.S. NSA SURVEILLANCE PROGRAMME, SURVEILLANCE BODIES IN VARIOUS MEMBER STATES 
AND THEIR IMPACT ON EU CITIZENS’ FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS AND ON TRANSATLANTIC COOPERATION 
IN JUSTICE AND HOME AFFAIRS, 2013/2188(INI) (Jan. 8, 2014), available at 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2009_2014/documents/libe/dv/moraes_1014703_/moraes_101
4703_en.pdf [hereinafter LIBE COMMITTEE DRAFT REPORT]; David Cole, We Are All Foreigners: NSA 
Spying and the Rights of Others, JUST SECURITY (Oct. 29, 2013, 12:48 PM), 
http://justsecurity.org/2013/10/29/foreigners-nsa-spying-rights; Office of the Press Sec’y, The White 
House, Presidential Policy Directive on Signals Intelligence Activities (PPD-28) (Jan. 17, 2014) 
(available at http://www.lawfareblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/01/2014sigint.mem_.ppd_.rel_.pdf) 
(recognizing “the legitimate privacy and civil liberties concerns of . . .citizens of other nations,” while 
not extending the same protections to them as available for U.S. persons). 
 18. For the purposes of our discussion, backdoor access also covers processes that may be better 
characterized as involving side-door access to data.  See also infra note 20 and accompanying text. 
 19. See infra notes 117-120 and accompanying text.  See also infra Part III.B.2. 
 20. See infra notes 112-113 and Part III.B.1 for further discussion of UPSTREAM.  This Article 
categorizes access to cloud data through the telecommunications infrastructure as backdoor access 
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showed how the NSA had systematically undermined encryption and security in 
available commercial systems through a variety of covert methods.21  These 
methods include the undermining of encryption standards, the covert influence of 
software design, and the pressuring of industry and firms to hand over encryption 
keys, thereby allowing for circumvention of security measures more generally.22  
Leaked documents suggest that these programs are conducted pursuant to Section 
702 of the FAA as well as Executive Order 12333.23  The latter sets guidelines for 
intelligence activities including foreign intelligence gathering conducted abroad, 
but does not involve any judicial or congressional oversight.24 
C. The Cloud Industry Responds While Being Caught in the Middle 
As discussed in more detail later in this Article, the revelations involving 
backdoor access have led to the strongest industry response.  Most fundamentally, 
backdoor access programs have forced cloud providers to rethink their relationship 
with (their own and foreign) governments and to take steps designed to prevent 
intelligence agencies from gaining unauthorized access to their systems.25  In other 
words, when cloud providers implement security measures against unauthorized 
access, they are forced to consider intelligence agencies as just another third-party 
adversary whose access they must block.26  The main difference is one of resources 
and skills: as compared with any other adversary, intelligence agencies have world-
class technology and expertise and seemingly unlimited budgets.  Furthermore, 
cooperation among allied agencies with similar capabilities acts as a force 
multiplier, as is the case with the “Five Eyes,” consisting of the U.S., the U.K., 
Canada, Australia, and New Zealand.27 
The international political response to the revelations of large scale 
                                                                                                     
because the interception takes place through the targeting of a third party other than the cloud provider, 
notwithstanding the fact that the intelligence community follows legal processes with respect to the 
telecommunications providers. 
 21. For information on the BULLRUN program, see infra note 114-116 and accompanying text. 
 22. See Nicole Perlroth, Jeff Larson, & Scott Shane, N.S.A. Able to Foil Basic Safeguards of 
Privacy on Web, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 6, 2013, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/06/us/ 
nsa-foils-much-internet-encryption.html (discussing documents which detail that the N.S.A. spends 
more than $250 million a year on its Sigint Enabling Project, which “actively engages the U.S. and 
foreign IT industries to covertly influence and/or overtly leverage their commercial products’ designs” 
to make them “exploitable”).  See also infra notes 113-116 and accompanying text. 
 23. Exec. Order No. 12333, 3 C.F.R. 200 (1981). 
 24. See infra notes 152-153. 
 25. See infra Part III.B.2 for a detailed discussion. 
 26. See Smith, supra note 2. 
 27. The Five Eyes collaboration is based on the UKUSA agreements.  See UKUSA Agreement 
Release 1940-1956, NAT’L SEC. AGENCY (June 24, 2010), http://www.nsa.gov/public_info/ 
declass/ukusa.shtml.  See generally JEFFERY T. RICHELSON, THE US INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY 347-
372 (6th ed. 2012).  Many of the programs revealed by Snowden involved cooperation between the NSA 
and the British intelligence agency, Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ).  See Nick 
Hopkins & Julian Borger, Exclusive: NSA Pays £100m in Secret Funding for GCHQ, THE GUARDIAN, 
August 1, 2013, 11:04 EDT, http://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2013/aug/01/nsa-paid-gchq-spying-
edward-snowden. 
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transnational surveillance has been significant.28  Foreign governments, such as 
Germany and Brazil, have not only sought clarifications from the U.S. but have 
also started to propose regulatory measures designed to counter it.29  In the EU-
U.S. context, the revelations have complicated ongoing trade negotiations,30 
imperiled the Safe Harbor Program,31 and emboldened the European Parliament to 
adopt poison pill amendments to the proposed EU data protection regulation.32  In 
the broader international context, Brazil has been particularly vocal about its 
objections to U.S. spying and, with Germany, sponsored a new United Nations 
resolution requiring a report on the protection and promotion of privacy “in the 
context of domestic and extraterritorial surveillance . . . including on a mass 
scale.”33  Moreover, the U.S. now faces significantly more opposition to its 
historically dominant position in Internet governance.34 
In addition, market conditions for U.S. cloud providers have deteriorated as a 
                                                                                                     
 28. For an overview of responses, see DAVID WRIGHT & REINHARD KREISSL, EUROPEAN 
RESPONSES TO THE SNOWDEN REVELATIONS: A DISCUSSION PAPER, (2013), available at 
http://irissproject.eu/wp-content/uploads/2013/12/IRISS_European-responses-to-the-Snowden-
revelations_18-Dec-2013_Final.pdf. 
 29. See, e.g., Alison Smale, Merkel Backs Plan to Keep European Data in Europe, N.Y. TIMES, 
Feb. 17, 2014, at A6, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/17/world/europe/merkel-backs-
plan-to-keep-european-data-in-europe.html; H. E. Dilma Rousseff, President of the Federative Republic 
of Brazil, Statement at the Opening of the General Debate of the 68th Session of the United Nations 
General Assembly (Sept. 24, 2013) (transcript available at http://gadebate.un.org/sites/ 
default/files/gastatements/68/BR_en.pdf). 
 30. See, e.g., Joshua Chaffin, Snooping Claims Add New Complication to Tough EU-US Trade 
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result of new doubts about the security and privacy of cloud data.  The revelations 
have also dealt a significant blow to the reputation of major Internet industry 
players, which have seen their brands implicated in the reporting about NSA spying 
programs.35  Cloud customers expect providers to reassure them that their data is 
safe and that firms are taking active steps to respond to these new threats.  The U.S. 
cloud industry not only feels besieged by government agencies seeking access to 
their systems left and right, but rightly worries that its overseas revenues will dry 
up due to customer mistrust or new restrictions on market entry.36  Although the 
increased emphasis on localization rules and requirements in foreign jurisdictions 
may smack of protectionism and local government surveillance demands,37 it 
further complicates the geopolitical situation facing the U.S. industry. 
And yet, despite the difficulty and complexity of these issues, doing nothing is 
simply not an option for cloud providers operating in international markets.  Thus, 
leading cloud firms have been thrust into legal and policy debates concerning 
transnational surveillance, both in the U.S. and abroad.38  In the policy context, 
industry has pushed with some success for more transparency about cloud 
surveillance, arguing that “transparency is essential to a debate over governments’ 
surveillance powers and the scope of programs that are administered under those 
powers.”39  In particular, industry players have joined calls for new international 
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agreements and argued for legal reforms domestically.40  As previously mentioned, 
and discussed in more depth in Part III, at the technical and organizational level, 
industry players are responding with the deployment of encryption measures to 
safeguard their customers’ data and there is an increased emphasis on the use of 
privacy enhancing technologies and innovative architectures for securing their 
services. 
Apparently, the methods of the intelligence community and new requirements 
that the industry faces abroad may force industry players to adopt new measures 
that could impact the balance of power between intelligence agencies and their 
targets.  While in the past, firms may have considered certain security and 
encryption measures too costly or inconvenient to implement, under the post-
Snowden calculus, they are now adopting them as a matter of business necessity. 
This is a sea change and also raises the question of whether and to what extent the 
intelligence community in the U.S. has the legal means and authority to counteract 
the pervasive use of measures aimed at restricting lawful access to data. 
As noted, this Article contributes to the policy debates regarding transnational 
surveillance by looking at the possible technical and organizational responses of 
service providers to such surveillance and their interaction with the relevant legal 
frameworks.  A policy solution to the problems of transnational surveillance is still 
absent and may require a significant overhaul of an international agreement on the 
legal frameworks for lawful access of data relating to individuals and organizations 
in the U.S. and abroad.41  In the meantime, affected industry players have started to 
explore solutions in the organizational and technical design of their services.  
In addition, the Article explores a related and timely issue, namely, whether 
existing legal authorities enable the intelligence community to prevent, limit, or 
modify these industry responses consistent with its intelligence gathering mission.  
This Article suggests that, even though the current framework allows for some 
governmental counter measures based on technical assistance provisions and other 
means, the answer to this question is generally negative.  It follows that, if the 
intelligence community wishes to block or reverse heightened and properly 
implemented security solutions, it will need to obtain new legal authority from the 
U.S. Congress.  A look into past precedents—such as the mid-90s debate over 
encryption export controls—suggests that industry may well prevail in this next 
round in the crypto wars. 
This Article proceeds as follows: Part II provides historical background 
concerning the availability and implementation of strong security measures in the 
commercial and international context and its impact on lawful access as well as the 
way in which the legal framework for lawful access for Internet services has 
developed accordingly.  Part III looks at industry reactions to the Snowden 
revelations by exploring several technical responses in more detail, discussing the 
                                                                                                     
 40. Id. 
 41. The likelihood of no-spying agreements between for instance the U.S. and Germany is 
reportedly low.  See Patrick Donahue & Arne Delfs, Merkel’s No-Spy Ambitions With U.S. May 
Collapse, Envoy Says, BLOOMBERG NEWS (Feb. 13, 2014, 9:14 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/ 
news/2014-02-13/merkel-s-no-spy-ambitions-with-u-s-may-collapse-envoy-says.html (quoting one 
official in the ongoing negotiations as stating that “[t]he Americans have no interest in giving up their 
sovereignty in this area”). 
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motivation of these responses as well as their aim and effectiveness.  Part IV 
considers to what extent the U.S. intelligence community—under existing legal 
authorities—can prevent, undermine, or mitigate these technical responses. This 
entails an examination of several bodies of law, including the technical assistance 
provisions in both the comprehensive statute regulating the gathering of foreign 
intelligence,42 the omnibus law setting standards for law enforcement access to 
electronic communications and associated data,43 and the law requiring telecom 
carriers to design wiretap-ready equipment.44  The Article serves as a discussion of 
what lessons may be learned from earlier confrontations in which industry sought 
for and won relaxation of encryption export controls despite law enforcement and 
national security objections.  The Article concludes with a number of observations 
about the future of transnational surveillance and the way in which technology and 
government responses and counter measures may shape governmental access to the 
cloud. 
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND  
A. Internet Security 
The early days of Internet security may be summed up in one word: neglect. 
From 1969, when the U.S. government established the ARPAnet with four 
geographically distributed computers communicating with each other using packet 
switching techniques,45 until the early 1980s, when the ARPAnet migrated to 
TCP/IP as its basic communication protocol,46 this “network of networks” lacked 
any formal security mechanisms and relied instead on social norms and 
reputational sanctions to ensure good behavior.47  TCP/IP lacked a security layer 
thereby leaving Internet traffic vulnerable to a range of attacks including spoofing, 
intrusion, and denial of service.48  It was not until 1992 that the Internet 
                                                                                                     
 42. See Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (FISA), Pub. L. No. 95-511, 92 Stat. 1783 
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 43. See Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 (ECPA), Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 
1848 (1986) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2522 (2012)) 
 44. See Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act of 1994 (CALEA), Pub. L. No. 103-
414, 108 Stat. 4279 (1994) (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1010). 
 45. See generally JANET ABBATE, INVENTING THE INTERNET (2000). 
 46. TCP/IP (Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol) is the basic communication language 
or protocol of the Internet.  It was co-invented by Robert E. Kahn and Vinton Cerf.  See generally 
JAMES F. KUROSE & KEITH W. ROSS, COMPUTER NETWORKING: A TOP-DOWN APPROACH (5th ed. 
2009). 
 47. SIMSON GARFINKEL & GENE SPAFFORD, PRACTICAL UNIX AND INTERNET SECURITY 451-52 
(2d ed. 1996) (“In the early days of the ARPANET, . . . [s]ecurity problems were rare: if somebody on 
the network was disruptive, tracking him down and having him disciplined was a simple matter.  In 
extreme cases, people could lose their network privileges, or even their job . . . . In many ways, the 
Internet was a large private club.  These days the internet is not so exclusive.  The Internet has grown so 
large that you can almost never determine the identity of somebody who is breaking into your system . . 
. .”).  
 48. See, e.g., Bob Metcalfe, Arpa Network Working Grp., RFC 602: The Stockings Were Hung by 
the Chimney with Care (1973) reprinted in SIMSON GARFINKEL & GENE SPAFFORD, WEB SECURITY 
AND COMMERCE 79 (2d ed. 2002) (identifying three security problems in the early days of the Internet: 
lack of security against remote access; unauthorized people using the net; and hackers breaking into 
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Engineering Task Force (IETF) began to seriously consider what needed to be done 
to secure the Internet.49 
By the mid-90s, the ARPAnet had split into a separate (and more secure) 
military network and a network of scientific and academic computers funded by the 
National Science Foundation (NSF), called NSFnet.50  In 1995, NSF completed a 
phased withdrawal to turn over this non-military network to a consortium of 
commercial providers, creating the predecessor to the Internet.51  In the early 90s, 
Tim Berners-Lee and his colleagues at CERN were inventing the World Wide 
Web.52  A short time later, Netscape released the first commercial web browser 
with a graphical use interface,53 and the general public began using the Internet and 
browsing the Web in ever increasing numbers.54  
As the Internet changed and Internet service providers (ISPs) began offering 
net access as a service to the public, the level of concern regarding Internet security 
(and privacy) changed with it.  As Vinton Cerf later observed, security and privacy 
concerns emerged when “the community of users grew from a fairly homogeneous 
cohort linked by common research interests to a highly heterogeneous, globally 
distributed population.”55  For example, when ISPs began charging members of the 
public who wanted to “go online,” they had an obvious reason to worry about 
authentication, because they needed to verify which customers were paying for 
their services.  Moreover, ISPs could not rely on the informal norms of “netiquette” 
to police their networks; they were offering a commercial service to the public and, 
therefore, had to take steps to protect their service against the growing menace of 
network attacks, malware, spam, and password theft.  
More generally, the promise of the Internet for transforming the world of 
commerce, communication, and other domains of societal activity would require an 
increased focus on security.  Thus, pioneering Internet firms like Netscape had a 
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encrypting Internet communications), see RANDALL ATKINSON, SIPP ENCAPSULATING SECURITY 
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 50. See ABBATE, supra note 45, at 185. 
 51. See id. at 194-99. 
 52. Berns-Lee and his colleagues developed the initial versions of HTML (Hypertext Markup 
Language), HTTP (Hypertext Transfer Protocol), and a Web server and browser.  See KATIE HAFNER & 
MATTHEW LYON, WHERE WIZARDS STAY UP LATE: THE ORIGINS OF THE INTERNET 257 (1998). 
 53. Id. (discussing the first graphical Web browser known as Mosaic). 
 54. See, e.g., K.G. COFFMAN & A.M. ODLYZKO, AT&T LABS—RESEARCH, THE SIZE AND GROWTH 
RATE OF THE INTERNET (1998), available at http://www.dtc.umn.edu/~odlyzko/doc/internet.size.pdf. 
 55. Vinton Cerf, Foreword to PETER H. SALUS, CASTING THE NET: FROM ARPANET TO INTERNET 
AND BEYOND, at ix (1995).  Like Vinton Cerf, Robert Kahn acknowledges the early neglect of security 
but for a different reason: 
It was only many years later when the net became really a public utility of sorts that 
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Robert Kahn, Getting the Net Off the Ground, BBC NEWS, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/programmes/ 
click_online/4317521.stm (last updated Mar. 4, 2005, 5:23 PM). 
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strong business incentive to develop new security protocols that would make the 
Internet safe for commercial transactions.56  In 1995, Netscape released an early 
version of the Secure Socket Layer (SSL) protocol, which underlies secure 
browsing and soon became “the most widely deployed cryptographic system in the 
world.”57  SSL and its successor, the Transport Layer Security (TLS) standard, are 
designed to provide communication security over the Internet using a technique 
known as public-key cryptography to exchange a symmetric encryption key, which 
encrypts the data flowing between a browser and a web server.58  TLS/SSL 
prevents both eavesdropping and tampering, thereby making it possible for the 
general public to go online safely for e-commerce, online banking, and other uses 
of the Internet that warrant security, privacy, and confidentiality.59  By building 
TLS/SSL support into its browsers, Netscape (and later all other browser vendors) 
ensured that the general public could automatically benefit from the significant new 
developments in cryptography.  
As the next Section suggests, however, industry’s somewhat belated efforts to 
secure the Internet clashed with the equally powerful needs of government 
agencies.  For example, both the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the 
NSA were determined to ensure ongoing access to information and 
communications over the Internet.  The FBI routinely seeks access to information 
and communications to conduct investigations and gather evidence for criminal 
prosecutions.60  The NSA, on the other hand, has both an information assurance 
mission, “preventing foreign adversaries from gaining access to sensitive or 
classified national security information,” and a signals intelligence (“sigint”) 
mission for which it “collects, processes, and disseminates intelligence information 
from foreign signals for intelligence and counterintelligence purposes and to 
support military operations.”61 
In the mid-90’s, industry and government clashed in particular over export 
controls on encryption.  The industry argued that the development and sale of 
popular U.S. software products with strong encryption capabilities should move 
forward without regulatory constraints, both to protect the nations’ vulnerable 
information infrastructure and to ensure the success of a vital industry that 
                                                                                                     
 56. See Denise Caruso, Netscape's Decision to Give Away Code Could Alter the Software Industry, 
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 58. The TLS/SSL protocol enables the communicating parties over the Internet to reliably and 
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 59. IETF TOOLS, supra note 58. 
 60. See generally NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, CRYPTOGRAPHY'S ROLE IN SECURING THE 
INFORMATION SOCIETY 81-94 (Kenneth W. Dam & Herbert S. Lin eds., 1996) [hereinafter CRISIS 
REPORT]. 
 61. Mission, NAT’L SEC. AGENCY, http://www.nsa.gov/about/mission/index.shtml (last updated 
Apr. 15, 2011); see also CRISIS REPORT, supra note 60, at 94-102.  
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depended on foreign sales for more than half of its revenues.62  Law enforcement 
and intelligence officials insisted that some level of export (and possibly even 
domestic) controls on encryption were necessary to protect their legitimate 
interests.63  Thus began the crypto wars.64 
B. The Crypto Wars 
Cryptography encompasses the use of codes and ciphers to protect valuable or 
sensitive information from disclosure to unauthorized third parties.65  Until the 
1970s, cryptography was the preserve of the military, foreign diplomats, and 
spies.66  Over the next several decades, and thanks to the invention of public-key 
cryptography by academic researchers working outside the military sphere, 
cryptography gradually moved into the mainstream of computer technology and 
electronic commerce.67  As the Internet became a mainstream communications, 
media, commercial, political and social tool for individuals, businesses, and 
governments, software companies and service providers turned to encryption for a 
variety of security needs. Encryption-based security solutions helped to protect 
electronic funds transfers, guard proprietary and other sensitive information 
(including digital content such as books, film, and music), and ensure the privacy 
and security of personal and business records and communications.68 
By the early 90’s, U.S. software vendors, responding to customer demand for 
greater security, added encryption functionality to then popular messaging and 
network programs.69 At the same time, independent developers like Phil 
Zimmermann developed Pretty Good Privacy (PGP), a program for protecting the 
privacy of email using the latest developments in public-key cryptography.70  By 
the middle of the decade, Netscape and Microsoft had both added support for SSL 
to their popular Internet browser and server products, which they wished to 
distribute both in the U.S. and abroad.71  Under the State Department’s 
interpretations of the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR), the export 
of strong cryptographic products was illegal unless the exporter succeeded in the 
cumbersome process of obtaining a munitions license.72  In contrast, the Export 
Administration Regulations (EAR), administered by the Commerce Department, 
granted general licenses for exports of mass-market software provided that the 
                                                                                                     
 62. See Ira S. Rubinstein & Michael D. Hintze, Export Controls on Encryption Software, in COPING 
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available at http://encryption_policies.tripod.com/us/rubinstein_1200_software.htm. 
 63. Id.  
 64. See generally STEVEN LEVY, CRYPTO: HOW THE CODE REBELS BEAT THE GOVERNMENT-
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 65. DIFFIE & LANDAU, supra note 57, at 11-14. 
 66. CRISIS REPORT, supra note 60, at 53. 
 67. See, e.g., id. at 364-95, 414-20.  
 68. DIFFIE & LANDAU, supra note 57, at 47-52. 
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software programs had somewhat weaker encryption capabilities.73  
In light of these regulatory hurdles, the U.S. tech industry began lobbying 
Congress and the Commerce Department to relax export controls on mass-market 
software with encryption capabilities, arguing that such controls were both 
ineffective (due to foreign availability of similar products) and harmful to U.S. 
industry’s competitiveness in worldwide markets.74  Both the FBI and the NSA 
countered that the broad dissemination of encryption products would become a 
major hindrance to their respective missions: strong encryption would prevent them 
from understanding messages they acquired through surveillance or other means, 
while even weak encryption, if used on a regular basis, would increase the cost of 
acquisition and analysis.75  
Faced with these conflicting viewpoints and arguments, the Clinton 
Administration sought a middle ground.  On April 16, 1993, it announced a NSA-
designed, tamper-proof encryption chip (the “Clipper” chip) together with a split-
key approach to escrowing keys.76  More specifically, the Clipper chip used a 
classified secure algorithm for encryption.77  Each chip also contained a unique key 
that was split into two parts at the time of manufacture for deposit with two U.S. 
government escrow agents, which would provide them to law-enforcement 
agencies upon presentation of a valid court order.78  By combining strong security 
with a key escrow system, the Clinton Administration hoped to balance the 
competing demands of industry and individuals for highly secure communications, 
with the needs of law-enforcement agencies.79  Moreover, the Administration 
promised that devices incorporating the Clipper chip would be exportable to most 
countries.80  
The software Industry rejected the key escrow initiative out of hand, arguing 
that customer demand for escrowed encryption was lacking and that all such 
systems were inherently less secure, more costly, and more difficult to use than 
non-escrowed encryption system.81  In addition, they argued that the whole idea of 
a key escrow with U.S.-based or U.S.-approved escrow agents was a non-starter in 
international markets.82  Over the next several years, the Administration sought to 
address industry concerns by experimenting with successive versions of the key-
escrow program but to no avail.83  Rather, a broad coalition of software, hardware, 
Internet, and telecom companies, trade associations, and public interest groups 
continued to pursue a multi-pronged effort to liberalize export controls, while 
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 77. Id. 
 78. Id. 
 79. See id. 
 80. Rubinstein & Hintze, supra note 62. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. 
502 MAINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 66:2 
opposing mandatory key escrow requirements.84  During this time, the industry 
coalition and the Administration turned to Congress for a solution and while House 
and Senate committees debated and approved several bills, Congress did not enact 
any encryption legislation.85  Finally, on September 16, 1999, in the midst of the 
Gore-Bush presidential campaign, the White House announced a major 
liberalization of U.S. encryption controls that permitted the export of mass-market 
software with strong encryption capabilities to non-governmental users in most 
countries (other than those subject to an embargo) as well as other regulatory 
changes.86  Clearly, the government backed down in this round of the crypto 
wars.87 
But the Administration had already won an important battle earlier in the 
crypto wars.  In 1992, responding to the growing complexity of the telecom 
industry and the transition to digital switches, the FBI put forth what it called the 
Digital Telephony Proposal, which would require telecommunications providers to 
help facilitate government interceptions of wire and electronic communications.88 
Two years later, Congress enacted the Communications Assistance for Law 
Enforcement Act (CALEA) despite industry objections based on costs, loss of 
privacy, and loss of industry control over the design of its services.89  Notably, 
Silicon Valley firms won an important concession: CALEA requirements would 
apply only to telecommunication services or facilities that enable a subscriber to 
make, receive, or direct calls, and not to “information services” such as e-mail 
providers and ISPs.90  In recent years, the FBI has sought to expand CALEA to 
Internet services, arguing that the original legislative carve out created a gap 
between its legal authority and the capabilities of Internet services to comply with 
wiretap and related orders in a timely and efficient manner, a problem it refers to as 
“Going Dark.”91  In 2010, the FBI first floated a proposal, dubbed CALEA II, that 
would extend the technical design mandates of CALEA to a broad range of Internet 
communications services.92  Given the controversial nature of the Snowden 
                                                                                                     
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. 
 87. See generally A. Michael Froomkin, It Came from Planet Clipper: The Battle over 
Cryptographic Key “Escrow,” 1996 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 15 (1996); DIFFIE & LANDAU, supra note 57; 
LEVY, supra note 64. 
 88. DIFFIE & LANDAU, supra note 57, at 205-206. 
 89. Id. 
 90. See infra Part IV.A. 
 91. See Going Dark: Lawful Electronic Surveillance in the Face of New Technologies, Hearing 
Before the Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, & Homeland Sec. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th 
Cong. 10 (2011) (prepared statement of Valerie Caproni, Gen. Counsel, Fed. Bureau of Investigation).  
 92. See Charlie Savage, U.S. Tries to Make It Easier to Wiretap the Internet, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 27, 
2010, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/27/us/27wiretap.html (“[O]fficials want 
Congress to require all services that enable communications—including encrypted e-mail transmitters 
like BlackBerry, social networking Web sites like Facebook and software that allows direct ‘peer to 
peer’ messaging like Skype—to be technically capable of complying if served with a wiretap order.”).  
As recently as last spring, the FBI renewed its proposal for a so-called “CALEA II.”  See Charlie 
Savage, U.S. Weighing Wide Overhaul of Surveillance, N.Y. TIMES, May 8, 2013, at A1, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/08/us/politics/obama-may-back-fbi-plan-to-wiretap-web-users.html.  
For a critique of CALEA II, see Joseph Lorenzo Hall, Leading Security Experts Say FBI Wiretapping 
2014] PRIVACY AND SECURITY IN THE CLOUD 503 
revelations regarding NSA surveillance methods (discussed below), it seems 
unlikely that the Obama Administration will have the necessary political support to 
enact any bill encompassing the FBI’s CALEA II proposal. 
C. Post-9/11: From Surveillance Reforms to the Snowden Revelations 
The two preceding Sections demonstrate how security, encryption, and 
surveillance intersected in the early history of the Internet and during the crypto 
wars.  They intersected again, and even more dramatically, in the period beginning 
immediately after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the World Trade 
Center and the Pentagon and ending with the Snowden revelations and their 
aftermath.  Seven weeks after the 9/11 attacks, Congress passed a new law greatly 
expanding the government’s electronic surveillance powers under FISA, ECPA, 
and other surveillance laws: the USA PATRIOT Act.93  Among other things, this 
act added a broad new definition of terrorism, authorized delayed notice of search 
warrants, expanded the definition of pen registers, authorized “roving” wiretaps, 
and permitted FISA applications even where foreign intelligence gathering was not 
the primary purpose of the investigation (as long as it was a “significant 
purpose”).94  In addition, Section 215 of the USA PATRIOT Act added a new 
provision to FISA authorizing the bulk collection and querying of telephone 
records.95 
In 2005, The New York Times reported that President Bush had issued 
executive orders, as part of a surveillance program entitled the Terrorist 
Surveillance Program (TSP), authorizing the NSA to conduct warrantless 
surveillance of telephone calls and emails from the U.S. to recipients abroad.96  Not 
surprisingly, multiple lawsuits and Congressional hearings ensued, challenging the 
legal validity of TSP and seeking reforms of FISA.97  In order to immunize the 
telephone companies that had cooperated with the NSA against liability and 
provide a legal foundation for intercepting communications where one party was 
located outside the U.S. and another party inside the U.S., Congress revisited FISA 
in 2007 and again in 2008.98  The second revision significantly broadened the 
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government’s power to engage in foreign surveillance.99  In particular, Section 702 
of the FAA authorized senior government officials to target the electronic 
communications of persons “reasonably believed to be located outside the United 
States” 100 without having to establish probable cause or seek the approval of the 
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC)101 of its decisions about which 
individuals to target, even if the interception takes place inside the United States.102  
Rather, Section 702 authorizes the FISC to approve annual certifications submitted 
by senior officials that identify certain categories of foreign intelligence targets 
whose communications may be collected, subject to FISC-approved targeting and 
minimization procedures.103 
On June 5, 2013, the British newspaper The Guardian broke the first of many 
stories involving the “Snowden revelations.”104  The leaks revealed—and continue 
to reveal—that multiple U.S. government collection and surveillance programs are 
seemingly beyond the scope of Sections 215 of the USA PATRIOT Act and 702 of 
the FAA.  The first article described an NSA program to collect millions of calling 
records of U.S. customers of Verizon, regardless of whether they are suspected of 
any wrongdoing.  This program involved the government collection of “telephony 
metadata” (but not the content of phone calls) on an ongoing basis, subject to the 
terms of a court order pursuant to Section 215.105  The next day, The Guardian 
reported on another NSA program referred to in the leaked documents as 
“PRISM,” under which the government collects the content of electronic 
communications, including “search history, the content of emails, file transfers and 
live chats.”106  One of the leaked documents suggested that the government was 
collecting this data directly from the servers of leading U.S. companies including 
Google, Facebook, and Apple, although the government and the companies 
involved have all denied such claims.107  
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These and other Snowden revelations ignited a firestorm of criticism.  The 
leaks sparked what many consider a long overdue debate on the nature and extent 
of the NSA’s surveillance programs and their impact on civil liberties, both in the 
U.S. and abroad.108  In the view of many, the revelations also caused immediate 
damage to U.S. foreign relations109 and national security.110  Additionally, the U.S. 
tech industry—and especially companies in the cloud computing industry—worried 
about potential spillover damage based on foreign businesses and governments 
threatening not to use their services because of concerns over NSA spying.111  And 
they had good reason for these concerns.  Over the course of the next several 
months, there were at least three additional press reports that undermined U.S. 
cloud services in the eyes of foreign customers.  First, in August 2013, The New 
York Times described another program conducted under Section 702 in which the 
NSA acquires communications by “systematically searching—without warrants—
through the contents of Americans’ communications that cross the border . . . 
temporarily copying and then sifting through the contents of what is apparently 
most [international] e-mails and other text-based communications.”112  This is 
sometimes referred to as upstream collection, because it apparently involves real-
time interception of communications as they pass through fiber cables or other 
major data pipelines.113 
A month later, The New York Times reported that the NSA has been engaged in 
and winning a “secret war on encryption, using supercomputers, technical trickery, 
court orders and behind-the-scenes persuasion to undermine the major tools 
protecting the privacy of everyday communications in the Internet age.”114  This 
program, which the leaked documents refer to as BULLRUN,115 is especially 
significant for present purposes because it reveals how NSA overcame its defeat in 
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the key escrow and export control debates by finding new ways to exploit vast 
amounts of encrypted online data. BULLRUN relied on a number of stealthy 
methods ranging from the use of superfast computes to break codes, to allegedly 
pressuring companies into handing over their master encryption keys or building in 
backdoors, to introducing technical weaknesses covertly into commercial 
encryption standards.116  
Finally, in October, the Washington Post reported that the NSA “has secretly 
broken into the main communications links that connect Yahoo and Google data 
centers around the world.”117  Whereas PRISM apparently provided front-door 
access to Yahoo and Google accounts through a court-approved process under 
Section 702 of the FAA, this alternative program, called MUSCULAR, intercepted 
Yahoo and Google data flows through the backdoor as they transited the 
companies’ private fiber-optic networks.118  In public statements, the companies 
expressed their “outrage”119 and, in the wake of these revelations, analysts 
predicted that U.S. tech companies may lose as much as $180 billion by 2016 due 
to international concerns about NSA’s spying.120 
III. INDUSTRY RESPONSES AND TECHNICAL SOLUTIONS 
A. The Response to Snowden Revelations 
The Snowden revelations have led to a wide variety of responses by different 
actors affected by government access to data and communications processed by 
cloud providers.  Although this Section focuses primarily on the response of cloud 
providers, it is useful to first consider the wider context by examining the responses 
of a few selected groups such as security engineers, and the privacy advocacy and 
human rights community. 
Due to the repercussions for information security products and solutions, 
members of the security engineering community have been particularly vocal in 
their condemnation of the methods used to gain access to Internet data by 
corrupting Internet security standards.  This community has also played a major 
role in interpreting and analyzing the technical aspects of the programs that were 
revealed by Snowden and their implications for the privacy and security of 
                                                                                                     
 116. Id.  In certain respects, however, BULLRUN is nothing new.  For earlier discussion of how 
governments in the post-9/11 era are increasingly dependent on the private sector to assist them in 
collecting and analyzing data for national security purposes, see Jon D Michaels, Deputizing Homeland 
Security, 88 TEX. L. REV. 1435 (2010); Jon D. Michaels, All the President's Spies: Private-Public 
Intelligence Partnerships in the War on Terror, 96 CALIF. L. REV. 901 (2008). 
 117. Barton Gellman & Ashkan Soltani, NSA Infiltrates Links to Yahoo, Google Data Centers 
Worldwide, Snowden Documents Show, WASH. POST, Oct. 30, 2013, http://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
world/national-security/nsa-infiltrates-links-to-yahoo-google-data-centers-worldwide-snowden-
documents-say/2013/10/30/e51d661e-4166-11e3-8b74-d89d714ca4dd_story.html. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Mathew J. Schwartz, NSA Surveillance Fallout Costs IT Industry Billions, INFORMATION WEEK 
(Nov. 27, 2013, 1:10 PM), http://www.informationweek.com/security/security-monitoring/nsa-
surveillance-fallout-costs-it-industry-billions/d/d-id/1112838.  
2014] PRIVACY AND SECURITY IN THE CLOUD 507 
communications, providing input for the public debate.121  
Edward Felten, a professor of computer science and public policy, and former 
Chief Technologist for the Federal Trade Commission, noted that “[i]n security, the 
worst case . . . is thinking you are secure when you’re not.  And that’s exactly what 
the NSA seems to be trying to perpetuate.”122  Bruce Schneier, a leading computer 
security specialist who has written extensively about the Snowden documents, 
echoed a broader sentiment in castigating the NSA for its “betrayal” of security 
engineers and free and open nature of the Internet.123  Debates are already 
underway within the IETF and the World Wide Web Consortium (W3C) on how 
best to counter the threats of pervasive monitoring and are likely to result in new 
and improved Internet security standards and practices.124  
Privacy advocacy groups around the world have used the Snowden revelations 
to intensify ongoing campaigns to limit government surveillance of Internet users.  
First, these groups have filed a number of court cases in the U.S. and abroad, 
including in the U.K., Germany, and the Netherlands.125  Within the international 
human rights community, there are several new initiatives to strengthen safeguards 
against government surveillance.  For example, the Inter-American Commission on 
Human Rights held an official hearing on the NSA’s mass surveillance 
programs.126  Additionally, in July 2013, a broad international coalition of more 
than four hundred human rights related NGOs finalized and signed the 
International Principles on the Application of Human Rights to Communications 
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Surveillance (“Principles”).127  The Principles condemn mass surveillance as a 
human rights violation and assert and interpret accepted principles such as 
proportionality, necessity, and transparency in the communications surveillance 
context.128  Finally, a broad range of NGOs have joined forces in the Stop 
Watching Us129 coalition and the more recent ‘Day We Fight Back.’130  The 
international human rights community has also condemned the treatment of 
Edward Snowden as a criminal rather than as a whistleblower and condemned 
restrictions on the reporting of the leaked documents.131  In a recent report, Frank 
La Rue, the U.N. Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right 
to freedom of opinion and expression, analyzed the implications of mass 
surveillance on the right to freedom of expression and the need for government 
surveillance practices to comply with human rights standards.132 
B. The Industry Response: Taking Care of Old Business  
In a recent article, reporter Steven Levy nicely captures the general response of 
Internet firms to the Snowden revelations by providing a look “inside their year 
from hell.”133  Levy documents industry’s struggle to craft a proper response to the 
uproar about direct government access to their servers (as alleged in the early 
reports of PRISM) and reassure overseas customers in light of the unhelpful U.S. 
government statements that NSA snooping was only directed at “non-American 
citizens.”134  Industry had little success in quelling suspicion and regaining trust, 
especially from foreign customers and governments.  “Every time we spoke it 
seemed to make matters worse . . . [w]e just were not believed,” explained one tech 
executive to Levy.135  
Quite apart from overcoming this atmosphere of general distrust, industry 
players had enough on their hands in deciding on a practical response to the 
Snowden troubles.  Of the many possible technical measures aimed at restricting 
undue access to online information and communication, the most obvious one for 
them to consider was more extensive use of encryption.  When properly 
implemented by cloud providers, encryption measures can help secure 
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communications and stored data against third party intrusions, including those of 
government intelligence agencies.136  At the very least, service providers could 
deploy encryption protocols like TLS/SSL to secure client-server communications 
between users and their own services.137  The MUSCULAR revelations suggest 
that service providers could also encrypt data more comprehensively once it arrives 
at their servers for processing or storage.138  Indeed, many of the measures 
discussed in this Section are but old wine in new bottles: that is, prudent responses 
to longstanding security risks that have been given greater urgency by the Snowden 
revelations.  If the cloud industry had taken information security more seriously 
years ago, their services would have been less vulnerable in the first place. 
Before turning to the specifics of the industry responses, it is worth briefly 
observing that despite the value of encryption measures in hindering surveillance, it 
has some limitations.  In particular, as long as a service provider holds or has 
access to its users’ encryption keys, it maintains the ability to access a user’s data 
in unencrypted form, notwithstanding the fact that data travels between a client and 
a server securely.  Moreover, for encryption measures to be effective in preventing 
backdoor access, industry must rely on cryptographic standards and 
implementations that have not been corrupted and must keep encryption keys out of 
the hands of government agencies.  This may seem obvious, but achieving it is less 
so.  Recent revelations related to NSA efforts to undermine cryptographic standards 
themselves are particularly worrying in this regard.139 
In its discussion of what should be done to promote security and trust in 
encryption technologies, the President’s Review Group implicitly rejected NSA 
activities undermining encryption standards by recommending that the U.S. 
Government should: “(1) fully support and not undermine efforts to create 
encryption standards; (2) not in any way subvert, undermine, weaken, or make 
vulnerable generally available commercial software; and (3) increase the use of 
encryption and urge US companies to do so, in order to better protect data in 
transit, at rest, in the cloud, and in other storage.”140  While specific 
implementations of encryption technologies may suffer from security weaknesses, 
the use of encryption generally helps protect cloud data against interception by 
third parties, including government agencies.  In contrast, no encryption or weak 
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encryption enables government agencies to access cloud data without having to 
rely on legal process directed at cloud providers or the targeted interception of key 
material.  
1. Securing Communications between Users and Cloud Services 
As recently as five years ago, most of the best known and free cloud services 
failed to encrypt the communications channel they used to transmit data to and 
from their users.  As a result, anyone gaining access to this communication channel 
could easily intercept private communications between the users and the service.  
Nor was it difficult to gain access given the combination of readily available 
interception software and insecure computing environments.141  
More recently, many of the major web-based cloud providers have begun to 
implement and enable by default standard encryption protocols, including the 
Hypertext Transfer Protocol Secure (HTTPS), which has been pervasive in the field 
of ecommerce and online banking for many years.  The Snowden revelations and 
the apparent massive collection of Internet communications content through 
programs such as UPSTREAM clearly demonstrate the value of encrypted 
communications between users and cloud providers.  When implemented properly, 
HTTPS ensures that the communications between the browser and the web-based 
service are secure from third party access.142  The protocol achieves this in two 
ways: first, it authenticates the identity of the service, and, second, it uses SSL/TLS 
to encrypt the data that subsequently flows between a user and this service.143  
Some services have taken additional steps to protect their users from government 
surveillance by implementing protocols with “perfect forward secrecy,” which is a 
property of certain encryption protocols that ensures that if an encryption key, 
which, if  is compromised, past messages with the user remain uncompromised.144 
Cost is the main reason that service providers delayed adopting this industry 
standard for cloud services.  Browsers have long supported the use of secure 
connections by users, but securing all the connections by default requires that cloud 
services increase their server-side processing capacity.  However, as market 
dynamics are now beginning to show, the costs for such encryption measures are 
not prohibitive.  The transition of web-based cloud service providers to HTTPS by 
default is now ongoing.  Google, Microsoft and Facebook have already enabled 
                                                                                                     
 141. Shared Internet access points, such as in Internet cafes, are often insecure and security practices 
of most users would clearly warrant the enabling of security by default.  For a discussion of security 
issues related to cloud services in 2009, see Ryan Singel, Encrypt the Cloud, Security Luminaries Tell 
Google, WIRED (Jun. 16, 2009), http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2009/06/google_ssl.  The expert 
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 142. See DAVID GOURLEY ET AL., HTTP: A DEFINITIVE GUIDE 202-10, 308 (Linda Mui, ed., 2002).  
 143. Id. at 308. 
 144. See Parker Higgins, Pushing for Perfect Forward Secrecy, an Important Web Privacy 
Protection, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (Aug. 28, 2013), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2013/08/pushing-
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HTTPS.145  One of the last major U.S. based web companies to respond to calls for 
implementation of HTTPS by default is Yahoo, which announced plans to start 
implementing it by early 2014.146 
In terms of securing web-based communications, however, the HTTPS system 
is no panacea against government surveillance.  First, the protocol must be properly 
implemented.147  Second, there are known attacks on the use of encrypted web 
communications through SSL.148  Third, intelligence agencies may work around the 
protections and attempt to secretly install software on the computers of targeted 
users, thereby allowing them to capture their communications before they are 
transmitted across an encrypted connection.149  Finally, and most importantly, 
HTTPS is not designed to protect data at rest.  Even if a cloud provider properly 
implements this protocol, this does nothing to prevent a government agency from 
obtaining the data it seeks by means of a compulsory order requiring the service 
provider to furnish this data.  Indeed, as Professor Peter Swire argues, the trend 
towards encrypting data in transit between users and cloud services may well result 
in governments shifting their attention from attacking the communication 
infrastructure to demanding that cloud service providers hand over stored data after 
it has been securely transmitted.150  The Snowden revelations already provide some 
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evidence of this shift and the measures detailed in this Section could accelerate this 
trend.  To counter this trend, governments confronted with encrypted 
communication channels could try to compel cloud providers to hand over their 
encryption keys, enabling the continued effective interception over 
telecommunications infrastructure (an option discussed further in Part IV).  
2. Securing Information Flows Between Data Centers 
The MUSCULAR revelations indicate that intelligence agencies are also 
systematically gaining access to cloud data through the targeting of the 
communications links between cloud provider data centers.151  Taken at face value, 
MUSCULAR suggests that the NSA has engaged in efforts to circumvent online 
security measures and surreptitiously collect customer data without serving legal 
process either on cloud providers or directly on customers themselves.  This does 
not necessarily imply that programs like MUSCULAR have no basis in the law.  
Rather, it seems likely that the NSA conducts this program under the terms of 
Executive Order 12333,152 which is the principal governing authority for U.S. 
intelligence activities outside the United States.153 
Nevertheless, industry has reacted very negatively to the NSA’s use of 
methods associated with the MUSCULAR program.  For example, Google’s 
General Counsel, David Drummond, stated that his company was “outraged at the 
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the ICCPR, EJIL: TALK! (Nov. 26, 2013), http://www.ejiltalk.org/foreign-surveillance-and-human-
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lengths to which the government seems to have gone” to gain access to customers’ 
data.154  At the same time, Drummond viewed MUSCULAR as a “very logical 
explanation” of the apparent discrepancy between the “massive amount of data” 
NSA reportedly held and the “small amount of data” that Google and others in the 
industry have been providing.155  Drummond’s response suggests dissatisfaction 
with MUSCULAR, at least in part because it removes industry from the 
government data gathering process.  Rather, industry statements suggest that 
government data access should respect a service provider’s organizational and 
technical infrastructure.  Similarly, Microsoft’s General Counsel, Brad Smith, 
contends that, except in rare circumstances, government should access customer 
data through the front door by serving legal process on the cloud service provider 
or its customers.156  Based on the revelation of MUSCULAR and similar programs, 
Smith stated that government snooping constitutes “an ‘advanced persistent threat,’ 
alongside sophisticated malware and cyber attacks.”157 
It is hardly surprising, then, that cloud firms like Microsoft have started taking 
steps to ensure that governments use legal process rather than “technological brute 
force to access customer data.”158  Microsoft recently announced “a comprehensive 
engineering effort to strengthen the encryption of customer data across [its] 
networks and services.”159  This matches similar activity of Google, which had 
started to encrypt data more comprehensively even before the specific revelations 
about the MUSCULAR program.160  As a Google security engineer explained 
shortly after these revelations, “the traffic shown in the [MUSCULAR] slides 
below is now all encrypted and the work the NSA/GCHQ (U.K. Government 
Communications Headquarters) staff did on understanding it, ruined.”161  Finally, 
Yahoo has announced it will “[e]ncrypt all information that moves between [its] 
data centers by the end of Q1 2014.”162  The encryption measures discussed above 
could help the cloud industry to counteract programs like MUSCULAR and 
UPSTREAM, which rely on the bulk collection of data by targeting communication 
links and the telecommunications infrastructure.  Of course, this assumes that the 
NSA does not seek to undermine these protections by relying on security 
weaknesses in the implementation or use of SSL or the underlying encryption 
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algorithms. 
3. Front-Door Access and Its Limitations 
If the measures described in the preceding Section are effective, they may help 
to push the intelligence community to seek access through the front door.  In the 
next Section, we will analyze to what extent the U.S. government may compel web 
services to assist law enforcement and intelligence agencies in gaining access to 
secure communications and what this implies about the efficacy of technical 
countermeasures such as encryption.  More generally, it is important to note that 
there are multiple ways to gain lawful access to information in the cloud and no 
clear legal rules with respect to which entity should be targeted (the clouds service, 
the cloud customer, or the communications infrastructure that is used to connect 
users and servers).  In the absence of such rules, cloud services may rely on 
technical and organizational measures to dissuade government agencies from 
targeting the communications infrastructure in favor of a more direct approach to 
the cloud service or the cloud customer.  There are two clear reasons for industry to 
have a strong preference against access through infrastructure not under its control.  
First, it negatively affects the relationship with their customers if third parties can 
gain access to data without the service provider’s knowledge and makes it hard to 
give guarantees about potential access to data by third parties.  Second, it would 
mean that sensitive or valuable business data is accessible to others in the value 
chain, who could try to use such access for competitive reasons. 
But while backdoor access is problematic from the industry’s perspective, even 
front-door access is not wholly satisfactory in terms of addressing the concerns of 
foreign customers of U.S. cloud services.  Most importantly, Section 702 of the 
FAA authorizes front-door access to cloud computing services under rules that 
offer reduced privacy protections to non-U.S. persons.  Once a so-called selector 
for the acquisition of foreign intelligence information has been internally approved 
within NSA, “service providers are legally compelled to assist the government by 
providing the relevant communications.”163  The differences in the safeguards 
applicable to U.S. persons and non-U.S. persons under the Section 702 program 
have been well-documented.164  Crucially, the Fourth Amendment does not apply 
to non-U.S. persons outside the U.S., which is clearly reflected in the language of 
Section 702 itself.165  
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It follows that foreign cloud customers, even after being reassured about 
enhanced security against backdoor access to data, may still not find the shift to 
cloud computing very attractive, given that they do not have access to optimal 
protection due to current market conditions and offerings.  It seems likely that as a 
result of the transition to cloud computing, the storage and processing of digital 
information will end up being handled by a relatively small number of players.  
Eventually, it is this market concentration that could make cloud providers a 
particularly attractive avenue for government surveillance.  But when data of a U.S. 
or non-U.S. cloud customer is sought from a cloud provider under Section 702 or 
similar programs, it raises the possibility that foreign intelligence agencies may 
gain access to the data of foreigners without their knowledge.  This represents a 
significant change in the status quo that organizational customers of cloud services 
may be unwilling to accept.  As mentioned, Microsoft recently asserted itself in this 
debate.  Specifically, it has stated the principle that lawful access should not take 
place through the targeting of cloud providers but through the targeting of the 
organizations themselves.  According to Microsoft, government agencies should 
“go directly to business customers or government customers for information or data 
about one of their employees—just as they did before these customers moved to the 
cloud—without undermining their investigation or national security.”166 
This may seem like a sound principle from the perspective of both cloud 
providers as well as their customers.  Yet it remains to be seen whether government 
agencies will respect it.  Absent special circumstances, such as the journalistic 
privilege or medical confidentiality, there are few general legal rules restricting 
lawful access to data being held by third parties.  In the absence of legal reforms, 
however, industry has started to explore the technical and organizational solutions 
for implementing this principle in practice.   
C. Innovations in Cloud Security: Taking Care of New Business  
This Section explores a number of more radical and comprehensive security 
measures in response to government surveillance concerns.  These measures differ 
from those discussed in Part III.B in two important ways: First, whereas Part III.B 
described techniques for preventing backdoor access, this Section explores 
techniques that complicate front-door access as well, and, in some cases, make it 
impossible or infeasible.  Second, the measures discussed below embrace the 
concept of Privacy Enhancing Technologies (PETs).167 
Claudia Diaz, Omer Tene, and Seda Gürses have recently analyzed a range of 
PETs “specifically aimed at enabling individuals to engage in online activities free 
from surveillance and interference.”168  They classify PETs into three categories.169  
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The first category covers PETs that require “active implementation” by a 
centralized service provider.170  These PETs consist mainly in sophisticated 
cryptographic protocols.171 They offer certain privacy guarantees with respect to 
user information while blocking the service provider’s access to such information.  
As Diaz points out, however, they only provide value to users to the extent that the 
provider actively invests in privacy-enhancing architectures that integrate these 
protocols into the service.172 
The second category encompasses client-side PETs as unilaterally deployed by 
the relatively small number of users who are ready, willing, and able to look after 
their own privacy interests when interacting with service providers.173  These PETs 
also include standalone encryption applications (like PGP) as well as browser add-
ons that help maintain the confidentiality of web-based communications or permit 
anonymous access to online services.174  These tools do not require any 
implementation by service providers, although service providers have been known 
to encourage or discourage their use.175  
PETs in both of these two categories discussed above may involve what many 
refer to as “end-to-end encryption” solutions because they provide continuous 
protection of data as it makes its way from end-user to end-user, regardless of the 
involvement of service providers.176  In particular, the client-side solutions are 
designed to allow sender and receiver to rely on an untrusted and potentially 
adversarial intermediary such as an ISP or a web-based email service.177  In 
contrast, SSL/TLS only protects the data in transit between a user and a service 
provider.  Thus, without further measures, the receiving party has access and even 
the possibility to tamper with a user’s data.  
A third category discussed by Diaz et al. consists of collaborative applications 
that dispense with the need for a centralized service provider operating the service 
or holding a user’s data.178  All three categories are relevant to cloud security, but 
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the first two categories (alone and in combination) are of particular interest for the 
purposes of this Article. 
1. The Prospect of Active Implementation of PETs by the Cloud Industry 
PETs researchers have developed a variety of privacy-preserving technologies 
based on advanced cryptographic protocols.  These protocols allow a service 
provider to operate a service “that takes as input private user information without 
the controller [i.e., the service provider] becoming privy to such information.”179  
In particular, researchers have designed smart metering systems and pay-as-you-
drive tolling systems that meet these requirements.180  While these systems remain 
in the design stage or early implementation stage, privacy-preserving identity 
management systems are available from well-known enterprise software firms such 
as IBM and Microsoft.181 
In the context of web-based and cloud services, there are a number of known 
solutions that can prevent access of service providers to the actual data of their 
users.  Specific examples include private information retrieval, searchable 
encryption, and Fully Homomorphic Encryption (FHE).182  Private information 
retrieval protocols make it possible for a service provider holding a searchable 
database to allow and respond to queries on this database without gaining access to 
the queries.183  Searchable encryption allows a service provider to provide query 
results on encrypted data under its control while, neither learning the search terms 
nor the results.184  Finally, FHE allows general computations over encrypted 
data.185  In other words, it allows a service provider to store encrypted data on a 
server, process this data without decrypting it, and send the encrypted results of any 
computations to the client for decryption, thereby fully satisfying the privacy needs 
of cloud customers.186  Not surprisingly, FHE is sometimes referred to as the Holy 
Grail of crypto research.187 
It is important to emphasize that adoption of the solutions discussed remains 
low even though some of them are ready for use.  There are a number of reasons 
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for this. First, some of these solutions, such as FHE, are at the very early stages of 
development.188  If service provision is limited to the mere storage of data in the 
cloud, it may be technically feasible for the service provider to anticipate and 
organize for encryption under the control of cloud users.  However, if the cloud 
provider also has to perform processing operations on the encrypted data stored by 
its customers, the implementation of privacy-preserving PETs in the cloud context 
is far more challenging and may even be impossible for complex operations.189  
Second, many cloud providers lack the incentive to adopt and further develop 
PETs based on advanced cryptographic solutions that would prevent them from 
having access to user data.  The reasons are obvious: many business models in the 
cloud industry depend on generating revenue based on access to customers’ data 
(e.g., profiling users for purposes of serving them targeted ads).190  Thus, for many 
cloud service providers, the costs of implementing these PETs (loss of profits) 
outweigh the potential benefits (improved security and privacy guarantees for their 
customers).191  Arguably, the new emphasis on security and privacy in the cloud in 
response to the Snowden revelations might incentivize industry to consider 
developing and adopting similar measures.  Notwithstanding the current lack of 
adoption, the point this Article seeks to emphasize is that if service providers were 
to deploy such measures, it would interfere with lawful access requests to cloud 
providers in some obvious ways.  For example, a provider might simply be unable 
to share unencrypted customer data with law enforcement or intelligence agencies 
notwithstanding a lawful request for such access.192  
2. Client-Side PETs and the Cloud: Perfection, Usability, and Uptake 
A second category of PETs offers client-side solutions that are deployed by 
users unilaterally to enhance their privacy while interacting with a central service 
provider.  This category includes various confidentiality tools for content that is 
hosted or shared through a third-party service.  For example, Mymail-Crypt, which 
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implements GnuPGP for Gmail, allows Gmail users to encrypt and sign their 
email.193  Similarly, Scramble!, which is a Firefox browser extension, allows users 
to share encrypted messages through Facebook without giving Facebook access to 
their data.194  In addition, there are several chat clients that integrate Off-the-
Record (OTR) protocols, which provide strong encryption for instant messaging 
applications.195  All of these client-side solutions allow users to ensure that non-
unauthorized parties cannot gain access to their data or communications when 
using a third-party service.  In addition, they “provide protection from surveillance 
by the [service provider] itself, who is no longer privy to content communicated by 
a user.”196  
What happens if the government serves a lawful request for the content of 
communications on a service provider whose customers utilize a client-side PET 
for encrypted email or chat?  At best, the service providers may hand over 
encrypted data but these PETs prevent it from furnishing unencrypted data.  On the 
other hand, the provider may fully comply with requests for traffic data unless the 
user combines a client-side PET with a collaborative PET like Tor.197  
Cloud providers’ attitudes to these client-side PETs are likely to remain 
ambivalent.  On the one hand, they may decide to block their use because they 
interfere with their business model and desired uses of the service;198 on the other 
hand, they may embrace PETs as proof of their good faith efforts to ensure 
customer privacy in the cloud.  By pointing out the possibility to adopt end-to-end 
encryption solutions, companies could reassure users who are rightly worried about 
the surveillance of their communications.199 
Although the availability of encryption solutions may seem attractive for users, 
they come with some well-documented downsides in terms of usability.200  As a 
result, only dedicated or expert users tend to take advantage of them.  In fact this is 
another oft-cited reason for industry to shy away from promoting client-side 
encryption solutions.  In addition, the client-side approach to security tends to rely 
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on the free or open source software model, in which developers release their source 
code, thereby allowing the security community to review the code and determine 
that the software is indeed secure.  From an ordinary user’s perspective, this 
substitutes trust in a group of security experts in lieu of trusting the third-party 
services.  Finally, it is true that the implementation of end-to-end encryption may 
help to protect against third party access to raw data through the service provider.  
From the perspective of managing information security more generally, however, 
many organizations and individuals may prefer trusting a dedicated service 
provider over having to rely on their own expertise. 
Of course, the Snowden revelations may boost the adoption of end-to-end 
encryption as a way of limiting the widely publicized systematic monitoring of 
global Internet communications.  Certainly, the NSA’s targeting of major cloud 
service providers through programs like PRISM has spiked interest in end-to-end 
encryption solutions, at least according to all the hoopla in the in the popular 
press.201  For the moment, however, there seems to be only a small niche market for 
services that cater to the demand for properly implemented end-to-end security, as 
evidenced by services such as Lavabit,202 Hushmail,203 Silent Circle,204 and 
Heml.is.205 
The Lavabit webmail service is an especially interesting example because of 
its ongoing legal battle with the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ).  Lavabit sought 
to provide encrypted email services, while resolving the usability issues typical of 
client-side solutions.206 The design involved a public-private key infrastructure 
managed by Lavabit.207 As usual, each user was assigned a public key and a private 
key.208  Whereas decentralized encrypted email standards such as OpenPGP require 
users to manage keys themselves,209 Lavabit stored and organized the encryption 
keys on behalf of its users.210  To prevent itself from having access to the private 
keys of its users, Lavabit encrypted the private key with a password known only to 
the user, which it did not store on its servers.211  In other words, Lavabit allowed 
the user to log into the service over an encrypted SSL/TLS connection with a 
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normal password and then gave the user access to his or her decrypted email. 
As a result of the design and it apparent focus on usability, the Lavabit system 
had some obvious weaknesses, as compared to powerful adversaries, which have 
been widely discussed in reaction to the Lavabit court case.212  In particular, anyone 
gaining access to the unencrypted communications between a user and the service 
would be able to retrieve the user’s password and decrypt all of the users’ email.  
After law enforcement successfully obtained a court order requiring Lavabit to 
hand over its private SSL key—thereby giving it access to the user’s password—
the owner of Lavabit decided to shut down the service in protest.213  It is to these 
types of legal conflicts that we turn in the next Section. 
IV. CLOSING BACKDOORS AND SHAPING FRONT-DOORS 
When looking at the measures discussed in the previous Section, it becomes 
clear that there are technical possibilities to design cloud services in ways that limit 
the ability of cloud providers to access the data of their customers.  This Article 
takes the position that the ongoing discussions over cloud security and the 
increased worries over transnational surveillance are likely to spur further 
innovation and subsequent adoption of such solutions in the marketplace. 
High-security demanding customers such as government agencies and 
corporate and organizational users with particularly strict demands for information 
security are likely to drive these market responses.214  Customers will insist upon 
better guarantees of security and confidentiality and may refuse to do business with 
popular, U.S.-based cloud services subject to far-reaching government surveillance 
powers.  Indeed, they may be barred from doing so under new proposals in Europe 
and elsewhere requiring their citizens to rely on local cloud services.215  In the 
market for individual users of cloud resources, there may generally be an 
increasing demand for better security and privacy safeguards as a result of the 
widely discussed examples of mass surveillance of online interactions and 
communication.  In addition, law and regulation may increasingly require that 
certain types of disproportionate lawful access to cloud data be excluded if cloud 
providers want unrestricted access to the market. 
Are these measures likely to be effective against intelligence agencies with the 
skills and resources of NSA or GCHQ?  The answer depends on a variety of 
factors, which will be discussed further in this Section.  One thing is clear: the 
range of technical solutions described in Part III is not binary, and recent 
announcements of ‘NSA-proof’ services seem highly oversimplified.  
A better way of framing this topic is to ask a series of more nuanced questions 
as follows: First, can technological and organizational design of services help to 
protect against backdoor access of data in the cloud?  Second, and related, can the 
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cloud industry help to prevent bulk and dragnet access to the data of their 
customers?  Third, to what extent can the technical and organizational design of 
cloud services help to shape lawful access dynamics, such as where and how lawful 
access takes place (i.e., which entity and in which geographical location)?  And, 
finally, to what extent can government agencies armed with surveillance orders 
counter the design choices of industry players when new technologies undermine 
lawful access to data in the cloud the government is seeking? 
Based on the analysis outlined herein, the first question should be answered 
positively.  As cloud services roll out new security and encryption measures with 
the goal of preventing bulk data collection by surreptitious means, this will 
undoubtedly interfere with large scale intelligence gathering, such as the 
interception of client-server and server-server data streams.  Firms like Google, 
Microsoft, Yahoo, and Facebook have already begun to implement well-established 
techniques such as TLS/SSL and perfect forward secrecy, just as various security 
organizations have begun to review how they develop cryptographic standards.216  
At the end of the day, the protection against backdoor access is also a matter of 
resources, however.  Certain technological solutions may prevent effective bulk 
collection through specific intelligence programs, but intelligence agencies could in 
turn deploy targeted intelligence operations to undo some of these protections 
implemented by cloud services.  
The second question, which concerns the possibility of cloud firms preventing 
dragnet surveillance, cannot generally be answered affirmatively.  Technological 
design may have some impact on front-door collection but where surveillance 
regimes like Section 702 of the FAA authorize large scale transnational 
surveillance directed at cloud services, industry has limited options.  It may oppose 
orders in court,217 or it may take a public stance to the effect that certain types of 
lawful access should not be legally permissible under current statutes and strive for 
legal reforms that would enhance the privacy interests of cloud customers.218  
The third question must be answered positively also, at least in theory.  
Technological and organizational design of services can help to shape lawful 
access dynamics and could be used precisely to do so.  While few cloud services 
have actively implemented privacy-preserving encryption protocols, there is reason 
to believe that this is changing.  As discussed in the previous section, both the 
cloud industry and the Internet security engineering community have taken the first 
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steps towards implementing technical and organizational measures to shape the 
lawful access dynamics induced by the use of their services and further innovations 
may be anticipated.  The extent to which local jurisdictions may force multinational 
cloud service providers to comply with domestic laws notwithstanding these new 
security measures remains a particularly hotly debated issue.219 
The fourth question can be rephrased as follows: Where the deployment of 
cloud services with new and/or improved security or cryptographic features limits 
or undermines lawful access, do investigative agencies have the legal authority 
under existing statutes to seek court orders compelling U.S. firms to modify their 
services or the power to persuade firms to do so in order to facilitate surveillance?  
More broadly, do U.S. firms (other than telephone carriers subject to CALEA) have 
a free hand in modifying existing services, or designing new services, to make 
them more resistant to programs like PRISM?  Or may the United States 
government rely on its surveillance powers to oversee the design of cloud services 
to ensure that court-ordered access remains achievable as authorized by ECPA and 
FISA? 
All of these questions, especially the fourth question, received some attention 
in 2007 when reports surfaced that Hushmail, an encrypted email service, had 
handed over “12 CDs worth of e-mails from three Hushmail accounts” in response 
to a court order.220  More recently, press coverage and blogosphere discussion 
exploded when a federal district court authorized the FBI to install and use a “pen 
trap” device regarding the email communications of a subscriber of Lavabit’s 
secure and encrypted email service; that subscriber was widely presumed to be 
Edward Snowden.221  The unsealed court records indicate that at a meeting in late 
June between Lavabit’s founder, Ladar Levison, and the FBI, Levinson refused to 
comply with the pen trap order.222 According to the U.S. Attorney for the Eastern 
District of Virginia, Neil MacBride, who was present at the meeting, it was not 
clear whether Levison refused “because it was technically not feasible or difficult, 
or because it was not consistent with his business practice in providing secure, 
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encrypted e-mail service for his customers.”223  MacBride then filed a motion to 
compel Lavabit to comply with the pen trap order, which also required that Lavabit 
provide the government with any technical assistance required to implement the 
order.224  Prior to a hearing on this motion, MacBride also (1) filed a motion for 
civil contempt, requesting that Levison be fined a $1,000 for every day that he 
refused to comply with the pen trap order; (2) obtained a grand jury subpoena 
ordering Levinson to testify in front of the grand jury and bring with him the 
encryption keys; and (3) obtained a search-and-seizure warrant authorizing law 
enforcement to seize from Lavabit “‘all information necessary to decrypt 
communications sent to or from [the account], including encryption keys and SSL 
keys,’ and ‘all information necessary to decrypt data stored in or otherwise 
associated with [the account].’”225 
At first, Levinson refused to comply with the pen trap order, arguing that 
handing over Lavabit’s SSL “master key,” would give the FBI access to the 
encrypted communications of all of Lavabit’s customers, and not just the target of 
its investigation.226  In a letter to the U.S. Attorney, Levinson conceded that “it 
would be possible to capture the required data ourselves and provide it to the 
FBI.”227  He then proposed to collect the data manually and send it to the FBI at the 
end of the 60-day order as well as intermittently as his schedule permitted; the 
government rejected this offer because it did not provide for real-time transmission 
of the intercepted data as required by federal law.228  Finally, after the court issued a 
contempt order against Levison, he handed over the SSL master key, but suspended 
operations of Lavabit rather than, as he put it in a message posted to the Lavabit 
web site, “become complicit in crimes against the American people.”229  
As the sealed pleadings became available,230 many commentators responded 
with outrage, characterizing the government’s demands for Lavabit’s encryption 
keys as “oppressive and abusive”231 and a “pathetic tale.”232  In what follows, we 
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analyze the relevant provision of ECPA and FISA requiring firms like Lavabit to 
assist the government with the installation of pen trap and other surveillance 
devices.  Next, we compare and contrast these provisions with much broader 
powers conferred by CALEA, at least as to telecommunications carriers.  Finally, 
we identify some guidelines for interpreting the government’s power to compel 
technical assistance and apply them to a number of cases including Lavabit.  
A. Technical Assistance Provisions: Statutory Language and Case Law 
There are several provisions in ECPA and FISA requiring firms to provide 
assistance in connection with court ordered interceptions,233 authorized requests for 
the installation of pen registers,234 and authorized directives for acquisition under 
Section 702 of the FAA, the FISA amendments.235  The language in all three of 
these provisions is very similar.  It requires that service providers and certain other 
entities furnish “all information, facilities, and technical assistance necessary to 
accomplish the interception unobtrusively and with a minimum of interference” 
with the services that the provider is providing to the targeted individual.236  
What does “minimum of interference” mean?  One of the few relevant cases is 
a Ninth Circuit decision concluding that the FBI’s proposed surveillance of oral 
communications within an automobile could not be completed with “a minimum of 
interference” with the in-car system's operation because it required the use of a 
passive listening feature that would have disabled other system services.237  While 
the court declined to say how much interference this Section permitted, it did note 
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that “‘[a] minimum of interference’ at least precludes total incapacitation of a 
service while interception is in progress.  Put another way, eavesdropping is not 
performed with a ‘minimum of interference’ if a service is completely shut down as 
a result of the surveillance.”238  This is consistent with the general principle that “an 
intercept order may not impose an undue burden on a company enlisted to aid the 
government.”239  It also rejected the dissent’s alternative reading of 18 U.S.C. § 
2518(4), according to which “even the complete shutdown of a service can 
represent the minimum interference, so long as no lesser amount of interference 
could satisfy the intercept order.”240 
An analysis of the differences between the technical assistance provisions in 
ECPA and FISA, on the one hand, and CALEA on the other, lends further support 
to the Ninth Circuit’s view of “minimum of interference” as something 
(considerably) less than total incapacitation of a service. CALEA’s intent was to 
preserve the ability of law enforcement officials to conduct electronic surveillance 
involving digital telephony.241  This law requires telecommunications carriers and 
manufacturers of telecommunications equipment to design their equipment, 
facilities, and services to ensure that a required level of surveillance capabilities is 
achieved.242  Telecommunications providers must be able to isolate and intercept 
electronic communications and deliver them to law enforcement personnel.243 
CALEA also contains three important limits.  First, CALEA does not apply to 
“information services,” such as e-mail and Internet access.244  Second, carriers are 
only responsible for decrypting, or ensuring the government’s ability to decrypt any 
communication encrypted by a subscriber or customer, if they provide the 
encryption service and possess the information necessary to decrypt the 
communication.245  Third, carriers must “facilitat[e] authorized communications 
interceptions and access to call-identifying information unobtrusively and with a 
minimum of interference with any subscriber’s telecommunications service and in 
a manner that protects . . . the privacy and security of communications and call-
identifying information not authorized to be intercepted.”246  
Although this third requirement superficially resembles the “minimum of 
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interference” condition in ECPA and FISA, in fact, it is radically different.  
CALEA includes an enforcement provision under which the court issuing a 
surveillance order may not only direct the carrier to comply with the order but also 
direct that a provider of support services to the carrier or the manufacturer “furnish 
forthwith modifications necessary for the carrier to comply.”247  This language is 
far more expansive than anything in the trio of “technical assistance” provisions 
examined above.  Under CALEA, carriers must design services that both comply 
with authorized governmental surveillance requests and do so in a manner that 
avoids disrupting the service, and if they fail to build-in surveillance capabilities of 
the appropriate kind, a court may order them to modify the service to achieve 
compliance.248  
In sharp contrast, information services are not subject to any such obligations 
under CALEA nor does this law confer any power on courts to order modifications 
to information services that may be needed to ensure compliance.  Do courts enjoy 
such powers under ECPA or FISA?  Presumably, they do not. Both statues are 
quite specific in their grants of authority and in their description of the conditions 
under which a provider (including various Internet services) may be asked to 
provide information, facilities, or technical assistance. While Congress has 
modified ECPA and FISA several times since enacting CALEA, it has not 
extended CALEA to information services, nor has it extended 18 U.S.C.§ 2522(a) 
to entities other than telecommunication carriers regulated by CALEA.  In the 
absence of these affirmative steps, the obligations on Internet firms to provide 
information, facilities, or technical assistance subject to the “minimum of 
interference” condition in ECPA and FISA must be distinguishable (and less 
onerous) than the corresponding obligations of telecommunications carriers under 
CALEA.249 
B. Applying the Analysis to Three Scenarios  
In light of the analysis in Part IV.A, we may now consider three common 
scenarios in which the government may demand that a service provider furnish 
information, facilities, or technical assistance with a minimum of interference to its 
service. The three scenarios involve: first, services subject to CALEA; second, 
services outside of CAELA’s scope and that may or may not have designed their 
own technical solutions for complying with surveillance orders; and, third, services 
not subject to CALEA that encrypt their customers’ communications as part of the 
service.  In each case, we try to determine the extent to which a service provider 
must modify the service, its features, or configuration, in order to comply with an 
authorized surveillance order under ECPA or FISA. 
The first scenario is straightforward: if the service is considered a 
telecommunications carrier under CALEA, then it must ensure that law 
enforcement officials can intercept communications on its network.  But even 
CALEA does not authorize law enforcement agencies to require any specific 
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design features or system configurations, nor does it prohibit the adoption of any 
feature or system configurations; rather, it leaves the design decisions to the 
discretion of the regulated services.250  Moreover, CALEA only requires support 
for decryption where “the encryption was provided by the carrier and the carrier 
possesses the information necessary to decrypt the communication.”251  In contrast, 
the service provider is not responsible for “decrypting, or ensuring the 
government's ability to decrypt, any communication encrypted by a subscriber or 
customer.”252  If, on the other hand, the service provider is an “information service” 
and, therefore, not subject to CALEA, then it has no obligation to design 
surveillance-ready services or to design features and system configurations, or to 
refrain from offering unbreakable encryption, subject to FBI oversight and 
approval.253  
The second scenario is more complicated.  If an information service not 
regulated by CALEA receives an authorized assistance order, and compliance with 
an assistance order entails minimal effort because the company regularly engages 
in similar activities on its own network for business purposes (such as routine 
maintenance, detecting and preventing fraud, security, or dispute resolution), then 
the company has limited basis to object to furnishing assistance.  For example, 
Google, Microsoft, and Yahoo provide web-based email services to hundreds of 
millions of customers in multiple countries and languages.  Suppose that any of 
these companies developed a capability to clone customers’ mailboxes for 
troubleshooting or security purposes (i.e., make a complete copy of a live mailbox 
that is configured in the same way and sends and receives all of the same messages 
as the original but does not in any way interfere with its functionality).  The 
company receives an order to hand over all email content for a few named accounts 
and, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2518(4), the FBI seeks its technical assistance in 
cloning the relevant mailboxes.  The company would have little basis for refusing 
to assist the FBI by cloning the mailboxes for the simple reason that under these 
circumstances the “minimum of interference” condition is surely met.  
Moreover, if the company lacked this capability or refused to develop its own 
solution, the FBI’s first resort would be a court order requiring the service provider 
to install the FBI’s own surveillance tools.  Towards the end of the 1990’s, the FBI 
developed a number of such tools including a program code-named Carnivore,254 
which came to light when EarthLink refused to install the device.255  Carnivore is a 
“packet-sniffer” (i.e., a program that records and analyzes network traffic) and it 
could be “configured for full wiretap or pen register mode; in the latter, the data 
content was ‘X-ed’ out.”256  In 2000, EarthLink was served with a pen register 
order and told by the government that it wished to install a device on EarthLink’s 
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network called “EtherPeek” to carry out the order.257  The company objected on 
two grounds: first, that doing so would threaten the privacy of its subscribers 
(because the device allowed the FBI to view the content and header information for 
all email messages, which exceeded the terms of the order); and, second, that 
enabling remote access to its network opened up a security hole that might be 
exploited by others.258  EarthLink then designed its own software solution to 
comply with the order but the government was dissatisfied and sought to install a 
different program called Carnivore.259  EarthLink opposed this and went to court, 
where a federal magistrate ruled against it, forcing EarthLink to install the 
Carnivore device.260  At some point, Carnivore disrupted services for EarthLink’s 
customers by crashing its remote access servers;261 however, the magistrate’s 
decision did not address these facts, nor did it consider the “minimum of 
interference” requirement under Section 2518(4).262  According to attorney Robert 
Corn-Revere, who represented Earthlink in the aforementioned litigation, 
EarthLink and the government eventually reached “an accommodation in which the 
device was installed and further assurances were made about network security and 
about protecting the privacy of subscribers generally.”263  
In short, if a service provider lacks a technical solution to comply with an 
interception or pen register order to provide the government with requested 
information, it seems that courts will issue appropriate orders allowing the 
government to install its own surveillance software inside the service provider’s 
network.264 As a result, any large service provider with the technical and financial 
wherewithal to build its own solution has a strong incentive to do so given that (1) 
it is likely to work better than the FBI’s; (2) neither disrupts the service, nor opens 
a security hole; and (3) minimizes government intrusion on customer privacy.  
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The third, and final, scenario is even more complex because it involves 
encryption, which is a method for hiding information from unintended recipients 
including law enforcement and national security.  Lavabit is a highly relevant case 
in point because it illustrates an underlying ambiguity in the “minimum of 
interference” condition.  As previously discussed, Lavabit offered secure email 
with advanced encryption features.265  When the government sought information on 
one of its customers, Lavabit refused to comply.  It argued that handing over its 
SSL master key would expose all of the mail sent or received by its customers to 
the prying eyes of the government, and therefore violated Lavabit’s promise of 
security via encryption, forcing it to shut down its business entirely.266  Yet, as 
Lavabit later confirmed, it could assist the FBI in installing a pen-trap device and 
providing access to the requested information in unencrypted form without 
disrupting its service.267  
This tension between Lavabit’s promise of security on the one hand, and its 
ability to assist the government despite this promise on the other, raises an 
interesting question with some troubling implications.  The question is this: if a 
firm such as Lavabit designs a secure email service that does not ordinarily enable 
the government to monitor all of its customers’ communications, can the 
government circumvent this assurance by means of a surveillance order supported 
by a grand jury subpoena for its encryption keys?  Orin Kerr, a leading expert on 
surveillance law, suggests that Lavabit’s claim that its business model somehow 
trumps the government’s power to conduct surveillance authorized by the Pen 
Register Act is a “really weak argument.”268  As Kerr suggests, it makes little sense 
to view a subpoena as oppressive or unduly burdensome merely because it allows 
the government “to conduct the surveillance it is allowed to conduct under the Pen 
Register statute.”269  
Kerr’s view may prevail but it neglects the broader implications of rejecting 
Lavabit’s argument, namely, that it incentivizes services like Lavabit to design 
secure email systems so that it is not merely burdensome, embarrassing, and 
economically injurious to comply with surveillance orders but infeasible, in the 
very strong sense of being technologically impossible to do so.  Ed Felten makes 
this point by comparing a court order to any other “insider attack” (i.e., an attack in 
which an employee “copies user data and gives it to an outside party”) and 
suggesting that there are good reasons for services like Lavabit to design their 
systems to protect against such attacks.270  According to Felten,  
In the end, what led to Lavabit’s shutdown was not that the company’s 
technology was too resistant to insider attacks, but that it wasn’t resistant.  . . . Had 
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Lavabit had in place measures to prevent disclosure of its master key, it would have 
been unable to comply with the ultimate court order—and it would have also been 
safe against a rogue employee turning over its master key to bad actors.271  
However the Lavabit case may be resolved,272 it sets up the far more difficult 
question of whether ECPA or FISA authorize a court to order a service provider not 
only to disclose a master SSL key, even though doing so violates customer 
assurances and may force it to shut down its service, but also to subvert the design 
of its service by installing malware on a target’s computer.  
This may (or may not) be an accurate description of what happened in the 
Hushmail case.273  Hushmail secure email service offers its customers two options: 
a high-security option, which requires that users install and run a Java-based 
encryption applet and encrypts and decrypts email only on the customer’s 
computer; and a low-security (non-Java) option, which is more convenient but less 
secure because it handles encryption and decryption on Hushmail’s web server.274  
As a result, Hushmail retains the ability to decrypt user’s emails when they select 
the low-security option (via an “insider attack” like that against Lavabit) but no 
ability to do so when the customer selects the high-security option.275  Of course, 
Hushmail’s design does not prevent the company from modifying the Java applet 
so that it captures the user’s passphrase and sends it to Hushmail, thereby enabling 
the company to decrypt the email and share it with a third-party including the 
government.  But it seems unlikely that the company would destroy its own 
business by subverting its software in this way and subject itself to a likely 
deceptive practice enforcement action under Section 5 of the FTC Act.276  Unlike 
Lavabit, none of the sealed documents in the Hushmail case have been leaked, so 
less information is available.  Also, it is not clear whether the 2007 court order 
pertained to a high-security or a low-security user; or if Hushmail modified its Java 
encryption engine; or if, in the interests of full disclosure, it merely pointed out the 
possibility of doing so.277  In short, the Hushmail case exemplifies the dilemmas 
that the government may begin to face if service providers take the next logical step 
of adding government agencies to their threat models and designing systems that 
protect against valid court orders.  And while the government has prevailed in its 
efforts to force niche players like Lavabit and Hushmail to capitulate, it may face a 
much greater challenge if major Internet firms like Microsoft, Google, and 
Facebook go down this path in response to the Snowden revelations. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
This Article describes and places in a legal perspective the cloud industry’s 
technological responses to the revelations about ongoing transnational surveillance. 
By focusing on industry responses and exploring the ways in which the 
technological design of cloud services could further address surveillance concerns, 
we provide insights into the prospects of these services shaping lawful government 
access to the cloud.  This intersection of service design, on the one hand, and 
government demands for access to data, on the other hand, signals a dynamic new 
chapter in the ongoing debate between industry and governments about the 
possibility and conditions of secure and privacy-friendly information and 
communications technologies (ICTs) for global markets.  
In particular, we have shown that it is helpful to distinguish between front-door 
and backdoor access to data in the cloud.  Our analysis of industry responses has 
shown the cloud industry is moving quickly to address interception of their 
customers’ data without their knowledge or involvement by adopting technological 
solutions that limit lawful access (as far as possible) to legal processes directed at 
the cloud service itself and/or its customers.  Many of these measures could have 
been implemented much earlier on.  They are now becoming industry norms. 
Industry standards like SSL/TLS and HTTPS, together with a new generation of 
PETs offering “end-to-end” protection, can be effective tools in preventing bulk 
acquisition through the targeting of the worldwide communications infrastructure.  
In short, technologies can help the industry shape lawful access even though 
they do not change the legal framework, nor do they overcome the lack of progress 
in reforming existing legal authorities (such as Section 702 of the FAA) to confine 
lawful access to the front-door of service providers.  We expect that this lack of 
progress—with respect to transnational legal guarantees of privacy and information 
security, not only in the U.S. but also elsewhere—will be a strong driver for the 
wider adoption of more robust and comprehensive privacy technologies in the 
cloud service context.  And we argue that under current conditions, the U.S. cloud 
industry will increasingly rely on technologies to ‘regulate’ government data access 
in an effort to enhance the privacy and information security protections of their 
foreign customers. 
This raises the pertinent question of how the U.S. government may respond to 
increased resilience of cloud services against lawful surveillance.  While FISA and 
ECPA allow government agencies to obtain orders that ensure the cooperation of 
providers notwithstanding strong technological protections, existing law does not 
allow for unlimited bargaining room.  Most of the services in question are not 
subject to CALEA obligations and an extension of CALEA seems neither 
warranted nor politically feasible under present conditions.  Moreover, most of 
these services have responded to the Snowden revelations by implementing 
stronger privacy protections (and even some advanced cryptographic protocols).  
No doubt they await the outcome of the ongoing litigation in the Lavabit case, 
which may clarify the government’s power to compel a service to break its security 
model in response to a valid surveillance order.  However, the Lavabit case does 
not yet present a scenario in which a service’s use of advanced cryptography makes 
it impossible to comply with a surveillance order by furnishing unencrypted data.  
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A U.S. government win in the Lavabit case may therefore be little more than a 
pyrrhic victory, for it could simply further incentivize industry to adopt even 
stronger technological solutions against surveillance, including both actively 
implemented and client-side encryption protocols preserving privacy in the cloud. 
  
